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Abstract 
The notion of contracts as reference points provides the basis for a 
deeper understanding of important phenomena such as the employment 
contract, vertical integration, firm scope, authority and delegation. 
Previous experiments lend support to this notion but they ignore 
realistic aspects of trading relationships such as informal agreements 
and ex post renegotiation or revision. Here we show that the central 
behavioral mechanism underlying contractual reference points is robust 
to such considerations. Our data reveal that informal agreements can 
mitigate the trade-off between rigidity and flexibility but they do not 
fully resolve the problem of misaligned reference points. Our 
experiments also show that contract revision is a more nuanced process 
than the previous literature has recognized. We find, for example, that 
it is sometimes better for parties to write a simple (rigid) contract and 
then revise it ex post if needed, rather than to anticipate and include 
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I. Introduction 
A series of recent papers develops the notion that ex ante contracts serve as reference points for 
ex post trade (see Hart and Moore 2008, Hart 2009, Hart and Holmström 2010). The idea is that 
an initial contract circumscribes what parties feel entitled to, but may not pin down a unique 
“fair” outcome. In the simplest version each trading party has a self-serving bias that leads him 
to hope for the most favorable outcome permitted by the contract. In flexible contracts that 
allow for multiple outcomes, buyers and sellers typically have different favorite outcomes so 
that misaligned reference points emerge. Although the parties will end up compromising, if 
they feel that they didn’t get what they are entitled to, they will be aggrieved and engage in 
counterproductive ex post behavior (e.g., quality shading). A rigid contract avoids this situation 
by limiting the number of outcomes and thereby aligning reference points. The downside of 
rigidity is that the terms cannot be adjusted to the realized state of the world, which can lead to 
ex post inefficiency. The theory implies that there is a trade-off between contractual rigidity 
and flexibility. 
Contractual reference points can explain employment contracts – which fix wages in 
advance and leave task discretion to the employer (Hart and Moore 2008); indexation in 
contracts and the role of payoff uncertainty for vertical integration (Hart 2009); and firm scope, 
authority and delegation (Hart and Holmström 2010). Initial evidence provides support for the 
approach (Fehr, Hart, and Zehnder 2009, 2011; henceforth FHZ), but previous studies neglect 
two key features of real-life trading relationships: informal agreements and ex post 
renegotiation or revision. 
Informal agreements and ex post revision can both potentially undermine the theory. 
Start with the first. The theory assumes that states of the world, although not verifiable, are 
observable. Observability suggests that trading parties could reach informal, state-contingent 
agreements: for example, they could agree to split the ex post surplus 50:50. If the parties can 
use informal agreements to “manage” expectations, they may be able to achieve the benefits of 
flexibility without incurring any costs. We conduct experiments that show that although 
informal agreements mitigate the trade-off between rigidity and flexibility they do not fully 
resolve the problem of misaligned reference points. 
Consider next ex post revision. Suppose that a buyer and a seller write a rigid contract 
to align reference points, and ex post the terms of the contract are such that an inefficient 
outcome will occur. Obviously, if revision is possible, the parties can change the contract to 
avoid this inefficiency. But this suggests that a rigid contract may not be costly after all: a rigid 
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contract can always be turned into a flexible contract. There is also a more subtle point. Suppose 
that the rigid contract leads to an ex post efficient outcome and so revision is not required. The 
fact that revision is possible may nonetheless influence parties’ entitlements: a party may feel 
entitled to an outcome outside the initial contract given that the contract can be revised. At an 
extreme the initial contract might cease to be a reference point altogether.  In this paper we 
show that contracts continue to be reference points in the presence of revision. We also identify 
circumstances in which a rigid contract that is revised can achieve the benefits of flexibility 
without incurring its costs. 
Our set-up builds on the baseline condition of FHZ (2011) (see Figure 1 for a timeline). 
A buyer and a seller can trade a widget. The buyer’s value is known in advance but there is ex 
ante uncertainty about whether the seller’s cost is high or low. Ex post trade is voluntary. Ex 
ante the buyer can choose between a rigid contract specifying a single price and a flexible 
contract specifying a price range. Contract terms are determined in a competitive auction among 
sellers. In rigid contracts the auction directly determines the fixed price; in flexible contracts 
the auction determines the lower bound of the price range. After the auction, a random device 
determines whether the seller’s cost is high or low. In flexible contracts the buyer can assure 
trade by choosing a price from the price range that equals or exceeds the seller’s cost. In rigid 
contracts the price is fixed and cannot be adjusted; this implies that trade is feasible only if the 
seller’s cost is low. If trade occurs, the seller can decide to provide either normal or low quality 
(i.e., shade). The provision of low quality is slightly costly. 
FHZ (2011) confirm Hart and Moore’s (2008) prediction that there is a trade-off 
between contractual rigidity and flexibility. Flexible contracts are useful because they guarantee 
trade in both states, but flexibility also causes a lot of shading since buyers and sellers seem to 
have misaligned reference points concerning the final price. Contractual rigidity helps to reduce 
ex post shading substantially, because a competitively determined fixed price seems to align ex 
ante expectations. But rigid contracts prevent trade from occurring when the cost is high. These 
results are reassuring for the theory, because most organizational implications of the model 
follow from the existence of this trade-off.2 
In this paper we implement two new conditions. In the informal agreement condition 
buyers have the opportunity to communicate informally their pricing plans in flexible contracts 
2 It is also noteworthy that the observed behavior cannot be explained either by traditional contract theory or by 
standard behavioral models. In particular, existing theories of social preferences (Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Bolton 
and Ockenfels 2000, Rabin 1993, Charness and Rabin 2002, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004, Falk and 
Fischbacher 2006) cannot account for the trade-off. See FHZ (2011) for a more detailed discussion. 
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i.e., they can make nonbinding state-contingent price announcements, which may align the 
trading parties’ expectations. Our data reveal that having this opportunity indeed reduces the 
shading rate in flexible contracts. As a consequence, flexible contracts become more attractive 
and are chosen more frequently than in the baseline condition. However, the decrease in shading 
is moderate and does not eliminate the trade-off between rigidity and flexibility. When informal 
agreements are available, low prices still trigger more shading in flexible contracts than in rigid 
ones. As a result, rigid contracts yield higher profits for buyers in the low-cost state than flexible 
contracts. This advantage is large enough to offset the disadvantage that rigid contracts do not 
allow for trade in the high-cost state. Even if informal agreements are available flexible 
contracts are, on average, no more profitable than rigid contracts. The result that informal 
agreements do not eliminate the trade-off between rigidity and flexibility is important, 
especially because the simplicity of our set-up (only two states, complete information) gives 
informal agreements a good chance to be effective. 
In our second new condition we allow for ex post revision. Specifically, we suppose that 
the buyer has the right unilaterally to replace the existing contract with a new one. Since the 
seller has no veto, this is actually closer to what lawyers call a “repudiation”. We chose this 
particular form of revision because it provides a powerful stress test for the relevance of 
contractual reference points: the easier it is to change a contract the less likely it is to serve as 
a reference point. We find that revision opportunities do not render contractual reference points 
irrelevant. Although revision is always feasible, the parties do not seem to hope for outcomes 
outside the ex ante contract when trade is feasible within the contract. Specifically, if buyers in 
rigid contracts decide to stick to the agreed upon price in the low-cost state, the shading rate 
remains the same as in the baseline treatment. This is a strong finding. As contracts can be 
changed at no cost, the contract choice is ultimately a framing decision without consequences 
for feasible outcomes. Nevertheless, sellers seem to accept the competitively negotiated fixed 
price as a reference point and do not feel entitled to an upward revision of the price. This makes 
it likely that contractual reference points also remain important when revision is more difficult 
and/or costly. 
Revision improves rigid contracts if costs are high, because revision allows the buyers 
to increase the price to cover the seller’s cost. While these mutually beneficial revisions trigger 
some shading (probably because of misaligned entitlements caused by the newly introduced 
flexibility), the gains from trade are still substantial and comparable to those in a flexible 
contract. Thus, buyers who choose a rigid contract not only benefit from low prices and low 
shading rates in the low-cost state; revision allows them to realize the same profits as with 
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flexible contracts in the high-cost state. Therefore, in our revision treatment, rigid contracts 
yield significantly higher profits than flexible contracts. 
However, revision is problematic to the extent that it leads buyers to engage in non-
mutually beneficial revisions: specifically, to replace the contract in order to lower the price 
and grab a larger share of the surplus. We show that such opportunistic revisions tend to cause 
sellers to engage in substantial shading. This finding is consistent with Hart (2009), who uses a 
similar view of revision or renegotiation to explain the empirical finding that contracts exhibit 
a self-enforcing range: they are respected in “normal” states of the world but are breached in 
exceptional circumstances (see, e.g., Klein 1996). 
Perhaps the most important implication of our revision treatment is that our findings 
provide support for a richer and more realistic view of the revision or renegotiation process. In 
standard incomplete contracting models the parties can always do better by committing not to 
renegotiate. As any renegotiation process can be built into the initial contract, any further 
renegotiation simply adds incentive constraints (see, e.g., Maskin and Moore 1999). Thus we 
would expect in reality to see parties going out of their way to make ex post renegotiation 
difficult. Yet there is little evidence that parties deliberately put sand in the gears of the 
renegotiation process3. Our study helps to explain this. If the parties build the revision process 
into the original contract—in our experiment this is equivalent to picking a flexible contract—
then this raises the seller’s feelings of entitlement in states where revision is not needed (low-
cost states) as well as in states where it is (high-cost states). The parties can do better by not 
incorporating revision initially and then revising ex post as needed. 
Our study is related to a number of recent experiments on behavioral contract theory. 
Brandts et al. (2013) explore the role of contractual reference points in a setup without ex ante 
competition and show that informal agreements may have a larger impact in purely bilateral 
environments. Hoppe and Schmitz (2011), Bartling and Schmidt (2013), and Iyer and Schoar 
(2013) report evidence consistent with our finding that opportunistic renegotiations are 
perceived as unfair and trigger lots of shading. We discuss these papers in much more detail 
after the presentation of our results (see Section V). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we describe the design 
of our experiment. Section III contains the behavioral predictions. We present our results in 
Section IV. Section V discusses related research and Section VI concludes. 
3 For a contrary view, see Rajan (2012). 
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II. Experimental Design 
We present the market set-up and the parameters in Section II.A. Section II.B describes the 
interaction of buyers and sellers. The details of the investigated experimental conditions are 
provided in Section II.C. We describe the laboratory procedures in Section II.D. 
II.A. Market Set-up and Parameters 
Each experimental session has an equal number of buyers and sellers. In every period of the 
experiment buyers and sellers have the possibility of trading a product. Each seller can sell up 
to two units, while every buyer can buy at most one unit of the product per period. Hence the 
supply of the product is twice as large as the demand, and sellers face competition for buyers. 
When a buyer purchases a unit of the product from a seller, his payoff is equal to his valuation 
for the product v minus the price p. The payoff of the seller is defined as the difference between 
the price p and the production cost c. The buyer’s valuation for the product depends only on the 
seller’s ex post quality choice q. The seller’s production cost, in contrast, also depends on the 
realized state of the world σ. There are two states of nature: a good state (σ = g), in which the 
seller’s production costs are low, and a bad state (σ = b), in which the production costs are high. 
The good state occurs with probability wg = 0.8. 
The payoffs of buyers and sellers can be summarized as follows: 
Buyer’s payoff: πB = v(q) – p. 
Seller’s payoff: πS = p – c(q, σ). 
When trade occurs sellers can choose between two quality levels: normal quality (q = 
qn) or low quality (q = ql). The production costs for low quality are slightly higher than the 
production costs for normal quality: c(ql, σ) > c(qn, σ). This reflects the idea that sellers can 
minimize costs if they simply provide the product desired by the buyer. However, they can 
sabotage output (at a small cost) if they want to.4 For each unit of the product which a seller 
cannot sell – either because he did not manage to conclude a contract with a buyer or because 
4 In Hart and Moore (2008), parties are assumed to be indifferent between shading (sabotaging) and not. We 
introduce costly sabotage to rule out equilibrium sabotage under standard economic assumptions. (We suppose 
that sabotage increases rather than decreases costs for reasons explained in FHZ 2011.) The quality choice of the 
seller in our experiment is similar to costly punishment technologies that have been used in many other cooperation 
experiments (see, e.g., Fehr and Gaechter 2000 for a typical example). However, our experiment differs from 
typical gift exchange experiments (see, e.g., Fehr et al. 2009 for a review of this literature). In gift-exchange games 
the pecuniary incentive for workers (i.e., sellers) is to provide the minimal effort (i.e., quality) level, whereas in 
our paper the normal quality level maximizes seller earnings. 
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his contract does not allow for a mutually beneficial trade – he realizes an outside option xS = 
10. When a buyer is unable to trade, he also realizes an outside option xB = 10. Table 1 
summarizes the cost and value parameters of the experiment. 
In the experiment sellers and buyers interact in groups of four (2 buyers and 2 sellers). 
To minimize the role of reputational considerations, these groups are randomly reconstituted at 
the beginning of each period. Thus, our protocol induces a series of one-shot interactions. 
II.B. Interaction of Buyers and Sellers Within a Period of the Experiment in All Treatments 
We describe the different steps characterizing the interaction of buyers and sellers in all our 
treatments. Particularities of the different conditions are discussed in the next section: 
Random formation of interaction groups: 
In every period groups consisting of two buyers and two sellers are randomly formed. 
Phase 1: Ex ante contracting: 
Step 1: Buyers’ contract choice 
Each transaction begins with the buyer’s choice of a contract type (t). The buyer chooses 
between a rigid contract (t = r) or a flexible contract (t = f). Rigid contracts define a single 
transaction price pr ex ante. Flexible contracts, in contrast, specify a price range [pl, pu] from 
which the buyer will choose the price ex post. The buyer can choose only the type of 
contract, but not the terms. The terms (i.e., the fixed price or the price range, respectively) 
are determined in a competitive auction among the sellers. In one of our conditions buyers 
have the option to make informal price announcements if they choose a flexible contract at 
this stage. In the other conditions no communication possibility is available. 
Step 2: Sellers’ contract auction 
After both buyers in an interaction group have chosen their type of contract, the two 
contracts are auctioned off to the sellers. The sequence of the auctions is randomly 
determined within each group. If a rigid contract is auctioned off the auction directly 
determines the fixed price pr ∈ [c(ql,g) + xS, 75] = [35, 75].5 In a flexible contract the auction 
5 The minimum of 35 for the fixed price ensures that the seller cannot make losses relative to his outside option in 
the good state even if he provides low quality. This feature guarantees that sellers do not refrain from choosing 
low quality, just because they want to avoid losses (loss aversion). The maximum of 75 for the fixed price ensures 
that the price is always below the seller’s cost in the bad state of the world. This guarantees that trade is infeasible 
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determines the lower bound of the price range pl ∈ [35, 75]. The upper bound of the price 
range is exogenously fixed and equal to the buyer’s valuation of the product when the seller 
provides normal quality: pu = v(qn) = 140. Thus, in both cases the auction starts off at 35 
and then increases by one unit every half second. Each of the two sellers has a button that 
allows him to accept the contract at any time during the auction. The first seller who is 
willing to accept the displayed fixed price or the displayed lower bound, respectively, gets 
the contract. The seller who loses the auction directly realizes the outside option xS (i.e., 
there is an outside option for each of the two auctions). 
Determination of the state of the world: 
After the contract auctions the computer randomly determines the state of the world for 
each contract independently. The state is common knowledge to the trading parties. 
Phase 2: Ex post trading: 
Step 3: Buyers’ choice of contract terms 
Once the state has been revealed, the buyer determines the final terms of the contract. How 
much flexibility he has in doing this depends on the experimental condition and the ex ante 
chosen contract. To initiate a mutually beneficial trade the buyer needs to be able to pick a 
price that covers the seller’s cost. (It should be emphasized that trade occurs whenever price 
covers cost: a seller cannot refuse to trade if price covers cost although he can of course 
shade, i.e., choose low quality.) The flexible contract always allows for such a choice, but 
the fixed price contract does so only in the good state; in the bad state the fixed price of a 
rigid contract is lower than the seller’s cost (pr ∈ [c(ql,g) + xS, 75] < c(qn,b) = 80 < c(ql,b) 
= 85). In the latter case trade is feasible only if the buyer can revise the contract (revision is 
permitted in only one of our experimental conditions). If the buyer cannot or does not want 
to revise the contract, trade does not occur and both trading parties realize their outside 
options. If the contract allows for trade the buyer either pays the fixed price (rigid contract) 
or picks a price out of the available price range (flexible contract, or revised contract).6 
within rigid contracts if the bad state is realized. However, in the experiment the competitive forces in the auction 
were strong enough so that the maximum was never binding. 
6 In the bad state the buyer has to ensure that the price is such that the seller cannot make losses, i.e., he must 
choose a price p ∈ [c(ql,b) + xS, v(qn)] = [95, 140]. Again we do not allow prices to be such that the seller can make 
losses by choosing low quality, since we want to avoid the possibility that people refrain from shading because of 
loss aversion (see also Footnote 5). 
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Step 4: Sellers’ quality choice 
Sellers observe the price choice of their buyer and then determine their quality. The sellers 
always have the choice between normal (qn) and low (ql) quality. Remember that choosing 
low instead of normal quality increases the seller’s cost by 5 units irrespective of the 
contract type and realized state of the world (see Table 1). 
Payoffs and Market Information: 
When all decisions have been made, profits are calculated and displayed on subjects’ 
screens. In addition, to their profit information buyers also get some aggregated information 
about the market outcome.7 
Subsequently, a new period begins and participants are randomly reassigned to new groups. 
II.C. Experimental Treatments 
In the following, we describe the baseline condition introduced in FHZ (2011) and our two new 
treatments. 
The Baseline Condition (BL) 
In the baseline condition neither informal agreements in the form of price announcements nor 
revision opportunities are available. 
The Informal Agreement Condition (IA): 
In the informal agreement condition buyers who choose a flexible contract in Step 1 can decide 
whether they want to combine the contract with a message of the following form: 
 “If costs are low, I plan to pay a price of pA(g). If costs are high, I plan to pay a price of 
pA(b).” 
The price announcements are in no way binding for the buyer, i.e., the message does not affect 
the range of actual prices available to the buyer ex post.8 The buyer can always pick prices 
7 The buyers are informed about average payoffs in rigid and flexible contracts of all buyers in all previous periods. 
In addition, they also learn how many buyers have chosen rigid and flexible contracts in the current period. The 
aim of the provision of this information is to make learning easier for buyers. Since our set-up allows for many 
possible constellations (two contract types, two states of nature, two quality levels, many prices), learning from 
individual experience is rather difficult. 
8 This also implies that the buyer cannot stick to his price announcement if the announcement turns out to be below 
the lower bound of the price range determined in the auction. We explain this in detail to the participants in the 
instructions. 
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which are higher or lower than the announced price if the competitively determined price range 
of the contract allows this. All market participants are informed about the presence of the 
message opportunity in flexible contracts in the instructions of the experiment, i.e., the 
availability of messages is common knowledge in the experiment. 
In the informal agreement condition revision of contracts is not permitted. Accordingly, 
rigid contracts allow for trade only in the good state of the world. In the bad state trading parties 
with a rigid contract have to realize their outside option. 
The Revision Condition (RE): 
In the revision condition, there are no informal agreements. However, buyers always have the 
possibility of revising the contract ex post (see Step 3 above). If a buyer decides to revise the 
contract, the original contract is no longer of relevance and the buyer can choose any price that 
satisfies p ∈ [c(ql, σ) + xs, 140]. The seller cannot veto the buyer’s decision to revise the terms. 
Revision is available for rigid and flexible contracts in both states of the world, i.e., the buyer 
can always decide whether he wants to stick to the competitively concluded ex ante contract 
and accept the imposed restrictions (i.e., the fixed price in rigid contracts and the lower bound 
of the price range in flexible contracts, respectively) or whether he wants to abandon the 
contract and pick his price without restrictions. 
It is useful to distinguish three types of revision which may occur in this condition. First, 
the buyer may revise a rigid contract in the bad state of the world. This allows for a price 
increase and makes trade feasible. As both parties benefit (at least weakly) from such a revision, 
we call this a “mutually beneficial revision”. Second, the buyer may revise a contract in the 
good state of the world in order to decrease the price to a level below the ex ante agreed upon 
fixed price or lower bound of the price range, respectively. We call this an “opportunistic 
revision”, because the buyer intends to increase his own profit at the expense of the seller. 
Finally, there is also the possibility that a buyer voluntarily increases the fixed price of a rigid 
contract in the good state of the world. We call these costly attempts to increase the seller’s 
profit “altruistic revisions”. 
II.D. Subjects, Payments and Procedures 
All subjects were students of the University of Zurich or the Swiss Federal Institute of 
Technology Zurich (ETH). We used the recruitment system ORSEE (Greiner 2004). Each 
subject participated in only one session. Subjects were randomly subdivided into two groups 
(buyers and sellers) before the start of the experiment. The subjects’ roles remained fixed for 
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the whole session. All interactions of participants were completely anonymous. The experiment 
was programmed and conducted with z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). 
To make sure that subjects fully understood the payoff consequences of the available 
actions, each subject had to read a detailed set of instructions before the session started. 
Participants then had to answer several questions about the feasible actions and the payoff 
consequences of different actions. We started a session only after all subjects had correctly 
answered all questions. The exchange rate was 15 Points = 1 Swiss Franc. 
In order to make the sellers familiar with the auction procedure we implemented trial 
auctions before we started the actual experiment. In the trial phase each seller had his own 
auction, i.e., they did not compete with another seller and no money could be earned. 
The data used in this paper was collected in several waves. For the baseline condition 
we use both the original data of FHZ (2011) (collected in 2007 and 2008) as well as new data 
collected in 2013. For the informal agreement condition and the revision treatment we use data 
collected in 2011 and new data collected in 2013. The recruitment procedures, the experimental 
instructions, the software and the computer laboratory were identical for all sessions. In 
addition, participants were always recruited from the same population (but obviously from 
different cohorts). In the new sessions conducted in 2013 the three treatments were randomly 
allocated to sessions. These sessions are therefore completely free from any potential confound 
stemming from intertemporal changes in the subject pool. Since we were unable to detect 
systematic differences in the results of the different treatments as a function of the data 
collection period, we pool the data from the different elicitation waves for the analysis. 
However, we also provide an online appendix in which we repeat the analysis only using the 
data from the sessions conducted in 2013. In the sessions in 2007, 2008, and 2011 we 
implemented only one matching group per session. In the new sessions in 2013 we increased 
the number of independent observations by having two matching groups per session. Overall, 
we have data from 12 independent matching groups for the baseline condition (5 sessions from 
2007 and 2008 and 4 new sessions9) and 11 independent matching groups for each of the other 
two conditions (5 sessions from 2011 and 3 sessions from 2013). As a result of no-shows the 
number of participants per session varies somewhat. In the 16 sessions with 1 matching group 
we had 28 participants in 9 sessions, 24 participants in 6 sessions, and 16 participants in one 
9 For one of the new sessions in the baseline conditions there was an exceptionally high rate of no-shows. In this 
session we implemented only one matching group (with 24 participants). To compensate for the loss of data, we 
conducted another session with two matching groups. 
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session. In the 9 sessions with two matching groups we had 32 participants in 7 sessions, and 
28 participants in the other 2 sessions. Thus, in total our analysis is based on data from 692 
subjects. A session lasted about two hours and subjects earned on average about 50 Swiss 
Francs (including a show-up fee of 10 Swiss Francs). 
III. Behavioral Predictions 
In this section we derive a set of hypotheses for our experiment. In section III.A we present the 
predictions that result from the assumption that people are purely self-interested money-
maximizers. While we do not believe that the self-interest hypothesis is an accurate description 
of our participants’ behavior, we still feel that these predictions are a useful benchmark, not 
least because much of the theoretical literature on incomplete contracts is based on models that 
assume pure self-interest. In section III.B we discuss how the presence of contractual reference 
points affects the predictions for our experiment. 
III.A. Predictions under Pure Self-Interest 
The prediction of the self-interest model is straightforward. Buyers anticipate that selfish sellers 
are never willing to engage in costly shading and therefore offer the lowest price permitted by 
the contract. Competition in the contract auctions implies that the fixed price in rigid contracts 
and the lower bound in flexible contracts are at the competitive level, i.e. pr = 35 and pl = 35.10 
This implies that rigid and flexible contracts yield the same profit for buyers in the good state 
of the world (πB = v(qn) – p = 140 – 35 = 105). In the bad state payoffs depend on whether 
revision is available. If the buyer can revise the contract, both contracts yield the same profit 
for the buyer (πB = v(qn) – p = 140 – 95 = 45) and the buyer is indifferent between the two. If 
revision is not possible, the rigid contract results in the outside option (πB = xB = 10) and 
therefore the buyer strictly prefers the flexible contract. Whether or not informal agreements 
are available does not affect the predictions. 
III.B. Predictions if Contracts are Reference Points 
In this section we discuss how the Hart-Moore notion that ex ante contracts provide reference 
points for ex post trade affects the predictions for each of our experimental conditions. For the 
10 Remember: Since p = 35 corresponds to p = c(ql,g) + xS and the seller must offer at least p = c(ql,b) + xS = 95 in 
the bad state of the world, a seller can never be worse off if he accepts a contract than if he accepts his outside 
option. 
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baseline treatment of FHZ (2011) contractual reference points have the following implications: 
While contractual reference points do not affect the prediction that the contract auctions yield 
competitive outcomes (pr = pl =35), they change the consequences of the buyers’ contract 
choice. Of particular importance is the fact that flexible contracts may imply that sellers feel 
entitled to high prices.11 If a buyer picks a price which is below the seller’s reference price, the 
seller may be aggrieved and engage in shading.12 As sellers may have heterogeneous reference 
points the frequency of shading is predicted to be decreasing in price. Thus, depending on the 
distribution of sellers’ reference prices it can be optimal for the buyer either to avoid shading 
by increasing the price to a level above the lower bound of the price range or to accept the risk 
of getting low quality. Rigid contracts should avoid the shading problem, because they pin down 
the price from the outset and thereby fix expectations. If the shading problem in flexible 
contracts is severe enough, rigid contracts may be more profitable for buyers, even though they 
prevent the parties from trading in the bad state of the world. 
In the informal agreement condition the central question is whether and to what extent 
the possibility of making ex ante price announcements allows buyers to “manage” sellers’ 
reference points. If price announcements give buyers some control over sellers’ reference 
points, buyers should try to push down reference points by announcing the lowest prices 
possible. Specifically, we would expect buyers to announce the competitive price for the good 
state (pA(g) = 35) and the lowest feasible price for the bad state (pA(b) = 95). As a consequence, 
sellers may feel less entitled to high prices and therefore low prices should trigger less shading 
in flexible contracts as compared to the baseline condition. 
In the extreme, informal agreements give buyers full control over seller’s reference 
points, i.e., the seller never feels entitled to prices beyond those announced by the buyer. In this 
case, buyers would always choose flexible contracts with low price announcements, because 
such contracts would not only allow them to implement the first best (i.e., shading-free trade in 
11 Hart and Moore (2008) assume that each party compares the ex post outcome to the most favorable outcome 
permitted by the contract. In FHZ (2011) we extend the model to allow for the case where parties may have 
heterogeneous reference points, i.e., we take into account that some traders may feel entitled to an outcome other 
than the most favorable outcome. We show that the predictions of such an extended model remain very similar to 
those of the original model. 
12 The assumption that sellers who feel aggrieved are willing to engage in costly shading activities builds on the 
extensive literature on negative reciprocity. Starting with the seminal paper by Güth et al. (1982) on the ultimatum 
game behavioral economists have accumulated a great deal of evidence that people who feel treated unfairly are 
willing to give up material payoffs to punish those who they blame for the unfair outcome (see e.g., Camerer 2003 
for a review of this line of research). 
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both states), but they would also be able to reap (almost) all the available gains from trade.13 
More realistically, however, informal agreements will give buyers only limited control over 
sellers’ reference prices. The buyer’s optimal contract choice will then depend on the base level 
of shading in flexible contracts and the extent to which informal agreements reduce this shading 
rate. The larger the impact of low price announcements on sellers’ reference points, the more 
attractive are flexible contracts for buyers. 
The revision treatment addresses two important questions regarding contractual 
reference points. The first one is: do contracts remain reference points even when revision is 
feasible? And the second question is: how is the reference point determined once revision has 
been initiated? The first question is of great interest for the cases where the parties decide to 
stick to the ex ante agreed upon contract. Basically, there are two interesting possibilities. One 
is that the parties continue to hope for their preferred outcome within the limits of the contract, 
i.e., the contract remains the reference point even though revision would have been possible. 
The argument for this possibility would be that sellers explicitly agree to the contract in the 
competitive bargaining process which turns the contract into a focal point that defines their 
expectations. The alternative view would be that contracts completely lose their meaning in the 
presence of revision opportunities and the parties simply hope for their preferred outcome 
within the set of all feasible outcomes (including ones that can be reached only if the contract 
is revised). This would imply that the reference prices are independent of the contract type, so 
that the buyer’s contract choice would no longer make any difference for ex post performance. 
Which of these two views is realistic can be determined only from the data. 
Obviously, the second question, i.e., the definition of reference points after the initiation 
of revision, is important only if contracts continue to shape reference points when revision is 
not initiated (otherwise the parties just hope for their globally preferred outcome, which is 
independent of the contract choice). Suppose that contracts do continue to shape reference 
points when revision is not initiated. One possible view is that revision simply turns the existing 
contract (be it a flexible or a rigid contract) into a completely flexible contract with price range 
p ∈ [c(ql,g) + xs, v(qn)]. We think that this view is a plausible one when it comes to mutually 
beneficial revision. In our set-up mutually beneficial revision occurs when the buyer revises a 
rigid contract in order to be able to increase the price in the bad state of the world. In this case 
the situation is indeed very similar to that in a flexible contract: both revised rigid contracts and 
13 As our design ensures that sellers cannot make losses even if they engage in costly shading, a small part of the 
surplus (5 points) would still go to sellers in this equilibrium (see Footnotes 5 and 6 for more details). 
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flexible contracts allow for the same price choices and there is no obvious reason why the seller 
should respond differently in the two situations. However, we do not think that this view is 
accurate when it comes to opportunistic revision. In our experiment opportunistic revision can 
occur if a buyer revises a rigid contract in the good state of the world and picks a price below 
the competitively determined fixed price, or if a buyer revises a flexible contract in the good 
state of the world and picks a price below the competitively determined lower bound of the 
price range.14 Since the buyer intentionally lowers the seller’s profit, opportunistic revision 
itself may be an important source of aggrievement on the seller side.  
IV. Results 
In this section we present our results. We compare both the informal agreement treatment (IA) 
and the revision treatment (RE) to the baseline treatment (BL) and discuss additional results 
that the two new treatments reveal. 
IV.A. Informal Agreements 
In the IA our main interest is to investigate whether the possibility of making non-binding ex 
ante price announcements allows buyers to “manage” sellers’ reference points. In section III.B 
we hypothesize that if announcing prices gives buyers control over sellers’ reference points, 
this should weaken or even eliminate the trade-off between contractual flexibility and rigidity. 
In particular, we should observe that i) flexible contracts in the IA are combined with low price 
announcements, ii) sellers in flexible contracts engage less often in shading in response to low 
prices in the IA than in the BL, and iii) the profitability of flexible contracts relative to rigid 
contracts is much higher in the IA than in the BL and buyers are therefore much more likely to 
choose flexible contracts in the IA. 
Table 2 and Figure 2 reveal that these predictions are partially supported by the data. 
Table 2 summarizes the most important outcomes for all three treatments. The table reports 
average prices, shading rates, average auction outcomes, profits and contract frequencies for 
rigid and flexible contracts separately. In addition, the table also indicates how often buyers 
attach a message to a flexible contract in the IA. Figure 2 depicts prices and shading rates in the 
14 It is important to mention that neither of these situations can occur in competitive equilibrium. If the fixed price 
or the lower bound of the price range is at the competitive level, the buyer cannot lower the price after revision. 
However, since we expect that auction outcomes will often deviate from the competitive level (although they 
usually converge to the competitive level over time, see FHZ 2011 for details on the baseline condition), it is useful 
to consider these situations anyway. 
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BL and IA graphically. While average prices in flexible contracts are essentially at the same 
level in the two treatments (Good State: 47.1 (IA), 48.7 (BL) / Bad State: 98.1 (IA), 97.6 (BL)), 
the shading rates are lower in the IA (Good state: 0.12, Bad state: 0.16) than in the BL (Good 
state: 0.23, Bad state: 0.23). However, only the effect for shading in the good state is 
significant.15,16 In line with the hypotheses above this increases the average buyer profit in 
flexible contracts in the IA (77.8) relative to the BL (72.1).17 Prices, shading rates and buyer 
profits in rigid contracts remain largely unaffected by the possibility of sending informal price 
announcements in flexible contracts (Prices: 38.8 (IA), 40.7 (BL) / Shading rates: 0.04 (IA), 
0.06 (BL) / Buyer profits: 81.8 (IA), 78.8 (BL)).18 As a consequence, buyers choose the flexible 
contract more often in the IA (70 percent) than in the BL (52 percent).19 
However, it is important to emphasize that the decrease in the shading rate in flexible 
contracts in the IA relative to the BL is not pronounced enough to eliminate the trade-off 
between contractual rigidity and flexibility in the IA. It is still the case that in the good state of 
the world both prices and shading rates are significantly higher in flexible contracts than in rigid 
contracts (Price: 47.1 (flexible), 38.8 (rigid) / Shading: 0.12 (flexible), 0.04 (rigid)).20 As a 
consequence, buyers who pick a rigid contract realize significantly higher payoffs (99.5) than 
those with a flexible contract (88.1) when the good state of the world is realized.21 The 
advantage of rigid contracts in the good state of the world is large enough to compensate for 
the disadvantage that rigid contracts do not allow for trade in the bad state. Overall, buyers with 
rigid contracts realize an average profit of 81.8, while buyers with flexible contracts make an 
average profit of 77.8. However, unlike in the BL condition, the difference in overall profits of 
buyers across contracts is not significant in the IA treatment.22 
The regression analysis in Table 3 provides further support for our results. Column (1) 
compares shading rates in rigid and flexible contracts when the good state has been realized. 
15 Ranksum tests (flexible contracts, IA vs. BL): Price: p = 0.218 (good state), p = 0.423 (bad state) / Shading: p = 
0.001 (good state), p = 0.422 (bad state). 
16 Because we randomly rematch participants within a matching group at the beginning of every period of the 
experiment, observations stemming from the same matching group cannot be treated as independent. We therefore 
perform all our non-parametric tests (ranksum, signrank) using one independent observation per matching group 
(all non-parametric tests are performed using matching group averages of the corresponding variable). All reported 
p-values for non-parametric tests are based on two-sided tests. All reported standard errors in regression analyses 
are adjusted for clustering at the matching group level. 
17 Ranksum test (flexible contracts, IA vs. BL): Buyer overall profit: p = 0.005. 
18 Ranksum tests (rigid contracts, IA vs. BL): Price: p = 0.242 / Shading: p = 0.712 / Profits: p = 0.424. 
19 Ranksum tests (IA vs. BL): Relative frequency of flexible contracts: p = 0.009. 
20 Signrank tests (IA, rigid vs. flexible contracts): Price: p = 0.003 / Shading: p = 0.004. 
21 Signrank tests (IA, rigid vs. flexible contracts): Buyer profit (good state): p = 0.003. 
22 Signrank tests (IA and BL, rigid vs. flexible contracts): Buyer profit (overall): p = 0.008 (BL) / p = 0.477 (IA). 
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Using observations from the IA and the BL we regress an indicator variable for shading on 
indicator variables for flexible contracts, the IA, and an interaction of the two. This regression 
confirms the following results: i) The shading rate in rigid contracts is low in the BL (constant 
= 0.058). ii) The shading rate in flexible contracts is significantly higher in the BL (“flexible 
contract” = 0.173, p < 0.001). iii) There is no significant difference between shading rates in 
rigid contracts across treatments (“IA” = -0.015, p = 0.317). iv) Although the shading rate is 
still significantly higher in flexible contracts than in rigid contracts in the IA (F-Test: “flexible 
contract” + “flexible contract x IA” = 0.076, p < 0.001), the difference is significantly smaller 
than in the BL (“flexible contract x IA” = -0.097, p < 0.001). In column (2) we additionally 
control for prices and also interact prices with all other independent variables. Including these 
additional variables does not change any of the results obtained in column (1). In particular 
column (2) reinforces again the finding that the reduction of the shading rate in flexible 
contracts is not strong enough to eliminate the disadvantage of the flexible contract completely. 
In other words: in the IA the shading rate at competitive prices remains significantly higher in 
flexible contracts than in rigid contracts (F-Test: “Flexible contract” + “Flex. contr. x IA” = 
0.132, p <0.001). Columns (3) and (4) compare shading rates in flexible contracts in which the 
bad state has been realized across treatments. Column (3) estimates the uncontrolled effect, 
while column (4) controls for price and also interacts price with the indicator variable for the 
IA. Both estimations confirm that the shading rates in flexible contracts in which the bad state 
has been realized are lower in the IA than in the BL, but the differences are not significant 
(probably because of the smaller number of observations). 
We find these results interesting. It seems that informal price announcements allow 
buyers to reduce shading in flexible contracts, but the effect is not pronounced enough to 
eliminate the trade-off between rigidity and flexibility. 
Table 2 also points out two other interesting results in the IA treatment: i) About half of 
the buyers (48 percent) who pick a flexible contract do not attach an informal price 
announcement to their contract, and ii) the average price announcement that buyers attach (if 
they attach one at all) is much higher (Good state: 52.0, Bad state: 102.1) than the predicted 
levels of 35 (good state) and 95 (bad state). These additional findings raise important questions: 
Why do buyers not use price announcements more often? Why do many buyers choose to make 
high price announcements? Where does the decrease in the shading rate in flexible contracts 
come from, given that buyers use informal agreements infrequently and often make high 
announcements if they use them? 
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In the online appendix we provide a separate analysis that investigates these questions 
in detail. Here we provide a short summary. Somewhat surprisingly, we find that buyers who 
decide not to make a price announcement do not suffer from a disadvantage. In fact, flexible 
contracts without price announcements lead to outcomes that are very similar to those under 
flexible contracts with low price announcements. However, this does not imply that the 
opportunity to make non-binding price announcements is without consequence. On the 
contrary, a comparison of flexible contracts without price announcements in the IA and the BL 
shows that the opportunity to make informal agreements significantly changes outcomes even 
if buyers decide not to make use of the opportunity. In particular, in the good state flexible 
contracts without price announcements lead to significantly lower shading rates in the IA (0.11) 
than in the BL (0.23). It seems that in the presence of the opportunity to reach informal 
agreements the sellers interpret a buyer’s choice not to attach a price announcement as a signal 
that the buyer does not plan to pay a high price. 
Explaining why some buyers decide to make high price announcements turns out to be 
more difficult. Buyers who attach high price announcements to a flexible contract tend to end 
up with low profits for one of two reasons: either they stick to their announcement and lose 
money, because they pay a high price; or they violate their agreement by paying a low price, 
which seems to make sellers unhappy and leads to a substantial increase in the shading rate. 
There are two possible motives that might explain why some buyers nevertheless choose to 
make high price announcements: First, there may be fair-minded buyers who simply prefer to 
pay a high price. This is consistent with the fact that some buyers stick to their high price 
announcements. Second, in the post-experimental questionnaire some buyers also wrote that 
they made high price offers to make the contract more attractive for sellers. This motive is 
somewhat misguided since contracts are attractive to sellers anyway and high price 
announcements which are later violated only increase the shading rate. Please see the online 
appendix for further details on these points. 
IV.B. Revision 
In the RE treatment our focus is on the following two aspects: First, we investigate whether 
contracts remain reference points even when revision is feasible. This is important, because ex 
ante contracts may no longer provide reference points once the trading parties know that it is 
feasible to change contracts ex post. Second, we examine how buyer-induced revisions affect 
sellers’ performance and how this depends on the circumstances under which revision has been 
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initiated. This analysis sheds light on the behavioral consequences of revision, an aspect that 
has so far received little attention in the literature. 
To investigate whether contracts remain reference points in the presence of revision 
opportunities it is most informative to compare outcomes of rigid contracts in the good state of 
the world across treatments. If contracts no longer provide reference points one would expect 
to either observe price revisions or more shading in the RE than in the BL. The intuition behind 
this hypothesis is that in the RE sellers might hope that buyers use their revision power to 
increase the price. If a buyer decides to stick to the competitively determined contract (which 
typically implies that the seller gets a low price), the seller may be aggrieved and shade. 
A comparison of the left-hand side of Table 2 (results of the BL) with its right-hand side 
(results of the RE) reveals that this hypothesis is not supported by the data. The competitive 
auction outcomes for rigid contracts are slightly lower in the RE (38.4) than in the BL (40.5), 
but the difference is not significant.23 The vast majority of buyers who choose a rigid contract 
do not revise the contract when the good state of the world is realized (the relative frequency 
of revision amounts to 0.09). As a consequence, the sellers in rigid contracts in the RE face 
slightly lower prices (38.7) than the sellers in the BL treatment (40.7), but this difference is 
again not significant.24 However, the most important result is that the shading rate is not higher 
in the RE (0.06) than in the BL (0.06).25 Figure 3 provides a graphical representation of these 
findings. The fact that the same prices do not trigger more shading in the RE than in the BL 
suggests that the presence of revision opportunities does not induce sellers to hope for high 
prices outside the boundaries of the ex ante contract. Even though sellers know that buyers 
could revise the contract and increase the price at no cost, sellers do not seem to expect buyers 
to do that. This suggests that contracts remain reference points even in the presence of revision 
opportunities. 
Further support for this finding comes from column (1) of Table 4. We use observations 
from non-revised rigid contracts in the RE and the BL in which the good state of the world has 
been realized and regress an indicator variable for shading on an indicator variable for the RE, 
the price, and an interaction term of the two. No coefficient in the regression is significant. This 
suggests that the availability of revision has not increased sellers’ proneness to engage in 
23 Ranksum test (rigid contracts, RE vs. BL): Auction outcome: p = 0.176. 
24 Ranksum test (rigid contracts, RE vs. BL): Price: p = 0.157. 
25 Ranksum test (rigid contracts, RE vs. BL): Shading: p = 0.829. 
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shading in non-revised rigid contracts even if the ex ante agreed upon prices are very low (the 
“RE” dummy measures the effect at the competitive price level of 35). 
For the examination of the effects of revision on sellers’ ex post behavior we need to 
distinguish between three types of revision: i) mutually beneficial revisions, ii) opportunistic 
revisions, and iii) altruistic revisions. 
Mutually beneficial revisions occur when a buyer in a rigid contract initiates revision to 
increase the price after the bad state has been realized. Because trade would be infeasible 
without revision, both trading parties benefit (at least weakly) from this revision. In Section 
III.B we hypothesize that such revisions simply turn a rigid contract into a flexible one, because 
in the bad state a revised rigid contract and a flexible contract allow for the exact same price 
choices. Table 2 and Figure 3 lend support to this hypothesis. Buyers in the RE frequently 
choose to revise rigid contracts in the bad state (the revision rate is 0.80). A comparison of 
outcomes in these revised rigid contracts and in flexible contracts reveals that both the price 
levels and the shading rates are very similar (Revised rigid contracts: Price = 97.6, Shading rate 
= 0.15 / Flexible contracts: Price = 96.9, Shading rate = 0.17).26  
Column (2) of Table 4 shows the corresponding regression results. We use observations 
from contracts in the RE in which the bad state has been realized and compare revised rigid 
contracts with flexible contracts. To this end we regress an indicator variable for shading on an 
indicator variable for revised rigid contracts, the price, and an interaction of the two. The fact 
that neither the dummy for mutually beneficial revised rigid contracts nor the interaction term 
are significant confirms that outcomes of revised rigid contracts and flexible contracts are very 
similar in the bad state of the world in the RE. 
Opportunistic revisions occur in the good state if a buyer decides to revise the price 
down to a level which is either below the ex ante agreed upon price (rigid contract) or the lower 
bound of the price range (flexible contract). Table 2 reveals that in the good state contract 
revisions are rare. Rigid contracts are revised in 9 percent of the cases. A closer analysis reveals 
that more than half of these revisions are altruistic revisions in which the buyer voluntarily 
increases the price. Opportunistic revisions therefore occur in only 4 percent (rigid contract) 
and 6 percent (flexible contract) of the cases. 
Figure 4 displays the outcomes of non-revised and revised contracts in the RE. The 
figure reveals that opportunistic revisions in which buyers simply attempt to grab a bigger share 
26 Signrank tests (RE, revised rigid contracts vs. flexible contracts): Price: p = 0.859 / Shading: p = 0.561. 
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of the gains from trade lead to very high shading rates (Rigid contracts: 0.52 / Flexible contracts: 
0.55). The corresponding regression analysis is found in column (3) of Table 4. We use 
observations from contracts in the RE in which the good state has been realized and regress an 
indicator variable for shading on indicator variables for rigid contracts and opportunistic 
revision and an interaction term of the two.27 We also control for the price level. The regression 
shows that opportunistic revisions increase the frequency of shading massively (0.483, p = 
0.004). The insignificant interaction term indicates that the large effect is present in rigid and 
flexible contracts (-0.032, p = 0.866). The finding that opportunistic revisions trigger strongly 
negative responses is important, because most existing incomplete contracting models abstract 
from the possibility that revision may lead to costly conflicts. Our results suggest that future 
theories need to take into account these psychological aspects of revision. 
Finally, we also observe a few “altruistic” revisions in rigid contracts. “Altruistic” 
revisions are cases in which the buyer initiated revision to increase the price although the good 
state had been realized and trade would have been possible under the original contract. Column 
(4) of Table 4 investigates the consequences of altruistic revisions on sellers’ shading behavior. 
Using rigid contracts in the good state in the RE, we regress an indicator variable for shading 
on an indicator variable for altruistic revision and control for the price level.28 Not surprisingly, 
the regression reveals that altruistic revisions do not trigger more shading (see also the graphical 
representation in Figure 4). 
To summarize: The RE yields three important insights: i) Contracts continue to provide 
reference points even if revision is feasible. Although prices are typically low, rigid contracts 
are rarely revised when the good state is realized. Sellers seem to accept this behavior and do 
not shade more than in the BL. ii) Mutually beneficial revisions seem to turn rigid contracts 
into flexible ones. Prices and shading rates in revised rigid contracts and flexible contracts are 
similar in the bad state of the world. iii) Opportunistic revisions are perceived as hostile and 
trigger very high shading rates. 
In addition to these three main results Table 2 also reveals another interesting finding. 
While the possibility of revising the contract has almost no effect on outcomes in non-revised 
rigid contracts (relative to the BL), outcomes in flexible contracts seem to be substantially 
different. Both prices and shading rates are much lower in the RE than in the BL. The 
27 To provide a clean comparison between non-revised rigid contracts and opportunistically revised contracts we 
exclude rigid contracts in which the price has been altruistically revised from the regression. 
28 We exclude observations in which the price has been opportunistically revised. 
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differences are most pronounced when the good state is realized, but they are also present in 
the bad state of the world.29 These findings seem to suggest that sellers evaluate outcomes in 
flexible contracts differently depending on whether or not the buyer has the opportunity to 
revise the contract. 
We explore this point in more detail in the online appendix. In short our analysis 
suggests that the availability of revision affects sellers’ perception of outcomes in non-revised 
flexible contracts. Sellers seem to be more willing to accept low prices in flexible contracts if 
they know that the buyer has the opportunity to revise the contract. A possible explanation for 
this effect is that the presence of the revision opportunity shifts the focus partly away from 
prices to the revision decision itself, i.e., there may be sellers who find all outcomes acceptable 
as long as the buyer does not revise the contract in opportunistic ways (please see the online 
appendix for more details). 
V. Related Literature 
While the field of behavioral contract theory has only come to life in recent years, the literature 
is growing rapidly. On top of our own previous work on which this paper builds (discussed in 
the introduction), there are several other papers that are directly related. Most relevant with 
regard to our informal agreement treatment is a recent study by Brandts et al. (2013) who 
(independently from us) also investigate how communication affects the frequency and 
effectiveness of flexible and rigid contracts. In stark contrast to our experiment they use a setup 
without ex ante competition. Hart and Moore (2008) argue that ex ante competition may be 
crucial to the extent that it is the objectivity provided by the market that turns the contract into 
a salient reference point. Interestingly, Brandts et al. (2013) find that without communication 
rigid contracts are superior to flexible contracts even in the absence of ex ante competition. This 
result suggests that contractual reference points may be more broadly applicable than 
hypothesized before. However, although the use of different parameters and procedures does 
not allow for a direct comparison of effect sizes, it seems that the trade-off between rigidity and 
29 The comparison of outcomes of flexible contracts in Table 2 is not entirely clean, because the data in the RE 
also includes flexible contracts which have been opportunistically revised. However, as our analysis above has 
demonstrated opportunistic revisions tend to increase the shading rate massively. Thus, if anything, the inclusion 
of opportunistically revised contracts biases the shading rate in the good state of the world upwardly. However, as 
opportunistic revisions are rare, this impact is negligible (we report the clean numbers in our more extensive 
discussion of this point in the online appendix). 
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flexibility that buyers face is less pronounced in their no communication condition than in our 
baseline treatment where competition is present. 
In a second treatment Brandts et al. (2013) allow for the same restricted form of 
communication as we use in our informal agreement treatment (non-binding announcements of 
state-contingent prices). They find that communication renders flexible contracts more 
profitable for buyers than rigid contracts. Also in their setup the effects of this form of 
communication are rather weak, but because the advantage of rigid contracts is small in the 
absence of communication, the effect is sufficient to destroy the trade-off between rigidity and 
flexibility. In a third treatment Brandts et al. (2013) introduce two-way, free-form 
communication over the full duration of the trading phase. They find that this more extensive 
form of communication substantially reduces conflicts in both types of contracts. As a 
consequence, flexible contracts clearly dominate rigid ones. The authors argue that free-form 
communication helps more than structured communication, because it allows the parties to 
establish a friendly relationship and helps to make promises more credible. 
Whether free-form communication would also increase the attractiveness of flexible 
contracts in a competitive set-up is an interesting and non-trivial question. In a setting in which 
a buyer faces multiple potential sellers, free-form communication becomes more burdensome 
as the buyer needs to communicate with many possible trading partners simultaneously before 
the contract is signed. In addition, competition may introduce incentives for strategic ex-ante 
communication which may undermine the credibility of promises. We think that this is a very 
interesting and important avenue for future research. Given our results and the findings of 
Brandts et al. (2013) it is important that we understand more deeply what exactly determines 
the degree to which communication allows the trading parties to limit conflicts. 
Regarding our revision condition there are several related papers. Bartling and Schmidt 
(2013) conduct a laboratory experiment in which a buyer and a seller can trade a widget but 
have to agree on the terms of trade before knowing the optimal time of delivery. If it turns out 
that there is a better delivery time than the one the parties have agreed to, the buyer can ask for 
a change in the delivery time. In response the seller can ask for a markup on the original price. 
To investigate the role of ex ante contracts for the revision phase, they compare this main 
condition (the contract treatment) with a condition in which the same threat points which 
endogenously emerge in the main treatment are exogenously imposed on the trading parties 
(the no-contract condition). They find that sellers ask for much lower markups and buyers are 
more likely to reject given markups in the contract condition than in the no-contract condition. 
These findings suggest that the initial contract serves as a reference point. Moreover, these 
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results are in line with our finding that revisions are quite unproblematic as long as they are 
seen as fair (which is typically the case if a seller asks for a low markup in response to a buyer’s 
request for a change in the delivery time), but lead to counterproductive conflicts if one of the 
parties feels that the other party has behaved opportunistically (e.g., if the seller asks for a high 
markup). 
Hoppe and Schmitz (2011) report a related result. In their experiment participants can 
use option contracts to avoid hold-up. Standard contract theory predicts that (some) option 
contracts are helpful only if renegotiation is not feasible (otherwise there is an incentive for a 
party not to exercise the option and renegotiate). However, the results of the experiment reveal 
that option contracts also improve performance if renegotiation is feasible. It seems that buyers 
often refrain from opportunistic price renegotiation, because they anticipate that many sellers 
feel entitled to the option price stipulated in the contract and would refuse to trade at a lower 
price (even if refusal is costly to the seller). These results further support the view that many 
people perceive opportunistic renegotiations or revisions as hostile and are willing to punish 
such activities. Iyer and Schoar (2010) observe similar behavioral patterns in a field experiment 
in which they confront wholesalers of custom-made pens with hold-up threats. Many of the 
wholesalers are not willing to accept lower prices even if this implies that they lose a valuable 
trade. 
The fact that similar behavioral patterns emerge in a broad set of different situations 
suggests that future theories of incomplete contracting are well advised to take the behavioral 
effects of revision into account.  
VI. Conclusions 
We show experimentally that the central behavioral mechanism underlying the concept of 
contractual reference points is robust to informal agreements and ex post revision. Our 
experiment provides further evidence in line with the idea that contractual reference points 
importantly shape performance in trading relationships governed by incomplete contracts. 
Our informal agreement treatment reveals that the possibility of making non-binding 
price announcement lowers the shading rate somewhat, but the effect is rather weak, so that the 
trade-off between contractual rigidity and flexibility remains. Hart and Moore (2008) point out 
that the idea of managing reference points through informal agreements has some force, but 
they argue that asymmetric information in combination with self-serving biases may limit the 
impact of such agreements considerably. Our results illustrate that (at least in certain 
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environments) asymmetric information is not necessary for the effects of informal agreements 
to be weak. In our set-up both parties are fully informed about the cost level of the seller. In 
addition, our set-up is very simple, in the sense that there is no uncertainty about buyer values 
and only two possible realizations of seller costs. This makes state-contingent informal 
agreements straightforward, because it is sufficient to determine a price for each of the two cost 
levels. We think it is therefore fair to say that we implement an environment in which informal 
agreements have a very good chance to be effective. In this sense the fact that we find a weak 
impact of informal agreements is a strong result. 
Our revision treatment yields three important insights: First, our results indicate that 
contracts continue to be reference points even if revision is feasible. Sellers do not seem to hope 
for outcomes outside the contract even if the competitively negotiated terms are not very 
advantageous to them. Second, in line with Hart (2009), we find that opportunistic revision in 
itself has important behavioral effects. If buyers revise a contract for opportunistic reasons, 
sellers respond with a very high shading rate. Finally, we also identify circumstances in which 
a rigid contract that is revised can achieve the benefits of flexibility without incurring its costs. 
In particular, it is sometimes better for parties to write a simple (rigid) contract and then revise 
it ex post if needed, rather than to anticipate and include future contingencies in a (flexible) 
contract from the outset.  
It is worth (re-)emphasizing some limitations of our work. In our informal agreements 
treatment we have restricted attention to particular types of communication and we have 
supposed completely symmetric information between the parties. In our revision treatment we 
have studied revision in situations that are very simple, and where the temptation to revise 
opportunistically is low. Investigating the robustness of our results in richer environments is an 
important topic for future research. 
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Figure 2 (Baseline vs. Informal Agreements): Prices and Shading Rates 
 
Notes: The figure is based on data from the BL and IA. In the IA flexible contracts include contracts with and 
without price announcements. Bars represent relative shading frequencies (left axis). Lines display the average 
lower bound of the price range, and dots represent average actual prices (right axis). 
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Figure 3 (Baseline vs. Revision): Prices and Shading Rates 
 
Notes: The figure is based on data from the BL and RE. In the RE the data for the good state include non-revised 
and revised contracts, the data for the bad state include revised rigid contracts (non-revised rigid contracts do not 
allow for trade) and flexible contracts. Bars represent relative shading frequencies (left axis). Lines display the 
average lower bound of the price range, and dots represent average actual prices (right axis). 
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Figure 4 (Revision): Shading Behavior in Rigid and Flexible Contracts  
 
Notes: The figure is based on data from the RE. “NoR” stands for contracts that have not been revised. “AltR” 
represents cases of “altruistic” revisions, i.e., rigid contracts in which the buyer has increased the price although 
the good state has been realized. “OppR” contains contracts in which the buyer has initiated an opportunistic 
revision to lower the price below the fixed price in rigid contracts or below the lower bound of the price range in 
flexible contracts. “MuBR” stands for mutually beneficial revisions. These are rigid contracts in which the buyer 
has increased the price to make trade feasible after the bad state has been realized. The bars represent relative 
shading frequencies (left axis). The solid lines display the average fixed price in rigid contracts, dashed lines show 
average lower bounds in flexible contracts and dots represent average actual prices (right axis). 
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Table 1: Experimental Parameters 
State of nature
Seller's quality normal (q = qn) low (q = ql) normal (q = qn) low (q = ql)
Seller's costs 20 25 80 85
Buyer's valuations 140 100 140 100
Good [Prob(s = g) = 0.8] Bad [Prob(s = b) = 0.2]
 
Notes: The table summarizes the main parameters of the experiment. Buyers’ valuations for the product and 
sellers’ production costs are displayed for both states of nature and both quality levels available to the seller. 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics – All Treatments 
Contract
State Good Bad Good Bad Good Bad Good Bad Good Bad Good Bad
Message sent - - - - - - - - - -
Av. Price Announcem. - - - - - - 52.0 102.1 - - - -
Revised contracts - - - - - - - - 0.09 0.80 0.06 0.00
Average Price 40.7 - 48.7 97.6 38.8 - 47.1 98.1 38.7 97.6 43.2 96.9
Rel. Freq. of Shading 0.06 - 0.23 0.23 0.04 - 0.12 0.16 0.06 0.15 0.13 0.17
Av. Auction Outcomce
Average Profit Buyer 97.0 10.0 82.1 33.2 99.5 10.0 88.1 35.4 99.0 31.1 91.7 36.3
Average Profit Seller 20.4 10.0 27.5 16.4 18.5 10.0 26.5 17.3 18.4 15.5 22.6 16.1
Share of  Contracts
0.52
Rigid
Baseline (BL) Informal Agreement (IA)
FlexibleRigidFlexible
25.3 16.8 24.7
40.5
78.8
18.2
39.9 38.9 38.4
72.1 81.8 77.8 85.4 80.8
17.8 21.3
Revision (RE)
Rigid Flexible
38.4 38.5
0.43 0.570.48 0.52 0.30 0.70
 
Notes: The table summarizes the outcomes for rigid and flexible contracts in all treatments. If meaningful the data are provided for each state of the world separately, otherwise 
the data are reported for both states together (centered entries in the table). “Message sent” indicates the share of contracts in which buyers attached a price announcement to a 
flexible contract. “Av. Price Announcem.” is the average price announcement made in contracts that had a message attached. “Revised contracts” indicates the share of revised 
contracts. “Average Price” is the average ex post price paid by buyers. “Rel. Freq. of Shading” measures the relative frequency of shading. “Av. Auction Outcome” stands for 
the average fixed price (rigid contracts) or average lower bound of the price range (flexible contracts) determined in the competitive auctions. “Average Profit Buyer (Seller)” 
are the average profits for the respective trading party. “Share of Contracts” indicates the relative frequency with which contracts have been chosen. 
31 
Table 3: Shading Rates in the BL and the IA 
Dependent Variable Shading Shading Shading Shading
Treatment BL & IA BL & IA BL & IA BL & IA
State Good Good Bad Bad
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Flexible contract 0.173*** 0.259***
(0.016) (0.038)
IA -0.015 -0.030 -0.066 -0.068
(0.015) (0.020) (0.059) (0.071)
Flex. Contr. x IA -0.097*** -0.128***
(0.020) (0.042)
Price increment 0.000 -0.012***
(0.001) (0.004)
Flex. contr. x Price inc. -0.007***
(0.002)
IA x Price inc. 0.004 0.002
(0.003) (0.005)
Flex. Contr. x IA x Price inc. -0.001
(0.003)
Constant 0.058*** 0.056*** 0.229*** 0.259***
(0.010) (0.015) (0.047) (0.056)
Observations 2826 2826 426 426
Clusters (Matching groups) 23 23 23 23
R2 0.048 0.072 0.007 0.026  
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) use data from rigid and flexible contracts in the BL and the IA in which the good 
state has been realized. Columns (3) and (4) use data from flexible contracts in the BL and the IA in which the 
bad state has been realized. “Flexible contract” is an indicator variable which is unity if the contract is of the 
flexible type and zero otherwise. “IA” is an indicator variable which is unity if the observation comes from the 
IA and zero otherwise. “Price increment” is equal to price minus 35 (good state) or price minus 95 (bad state). 
This implies that the constant measures the shading rate in rigid contracts in the BL at the competitive price 
level (35 or 95, respectively). All columns report coefficients of OLS estimations (linear probability model). 
Since observations within matching groups may be dependent all reported standard errors are adjusted for 
clustering at the matching group level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 4: Shading in Non-Revised and Revised Contracts in the RE 
Dependent Variable Shading Shading Shading Shading
Treatment BL & RE RE RE RE
State Good Bad Good Good
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RE 0.001
(0.019)
Price increment 0.000 -0.013 -0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001)
RE x Price inc. -0.000
(0.002)
MB Revision -0.010
(0.061)
MB Rev. x Price inc. -0.001
(0.008)
Flexible Contract 0.062*
-0.028
OPP Revision 0.483***
(0.130)
Flex contr. x OPP Rev. -0.032
(0.185)
ALT Revision -0.012
(0.041)
Constant 0.056*** 0.194*** 0.042*** 0.039***
(0.015) (0.059) (0.009) (0.009)
Observations 1295 298 1272 552
Clusters (Match. Groups) 23 11 11 11
R2 0.000 0.021 0.136 0.000
 
Notes: Column (1) uses data from non-revised rigid contracts in the BL and the RE in which the good state has 
been realized. Column (2) uses data from revised rigid contracts and flexible contracts in the RE in which the 
bad state of the world has been realized. Columns (3) and (4) use data from rigid contracts in the RE in which 
the good state has been realized. In column (3) observations with altruistic revisions are excluded. In column 
(4) observations with opportunistic revisions are excluded. “RE” is an indicator variable which is unity if the 
observation comes from the RE. “Price increment” is equal to price minus 35 (good state) or price minus 95 
(bad state). “MB Revision” is an indicator variable which is unity if a rigid contract has been revised after the 
bad state of the world has been realized (mutually beneficial revision). “Flexible contract” is an indicator 
variable which is unity if the contract is of the flexible type and zero otherwise. “OPP Revision” is an indicator 
variable which is unity if a rigid or a flexible contract has been revised in the good state of the world and the 
buyer lowered the price to a level below the auction outcome (opportunistic revision). “ALT Revision” is an 
indicator variable which is unity if a contract has been revised in the good state of the world and the buyer 
increased the price to a level above the auction outcome (altruistic revision). All columns report coefficients of 
OLS estimations (linear probability model). Since observations within matching groups may be dependent all 
reported standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the matching group level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Online Appendix – Part A: Additional Results 
In this first part of the online appendix we provide a more detailed analysis of the additional 
results briefly discussed at the end of sections IV.A and IV.B in the main text of the paper. 
A.1 Informal Agreements 
In this part we analyze in more detail how informal price announcements affect outcomes in 
flexible contracts. Figure A1 illustrates how buyers make use of the possibility of attaching 
non-binding price announcements to flexible contracts. The labels on the horizontal axis 
categorize the different types of flexible contracts that we observe in the experiment. While 
“No” stands for flexible contracts without a price announcement, the remaining categories 
indicate the level of the price announcement in contracts with informal agreements (e.g., “40” 
means that the buyer has announced a price in the range [35, 40], “50” stands for an 
announcement in the range [41,50] etc.). The bars represent the relative frequencies of price 
announcements in the corresponding range. Cases in which the buyer has violated the informal 
agreement (i.e., the actual price is lower than the price announcement) are displayed in light 
grey, while cases in which informal agreements have been honored (i.e., the actual price is equal 
to or higher than the price announcement) are displayed in dark grey. The dots represent 
averages of ex post prices paid by buyers for each type of flexible contract. The figure shows 
that the use of informal state-contingent contracts is not intense. About half of the buyers (48 
percent) who choose flexible contracts do not attach a price announcement.30 Furthermore, 
among those who make announcements surprisingly few choose to indicate low prices: less 
than a third (31 percent) of the submitted messages indicate a price of 40 or less for the good 
state and a price of 100 or less for the bad state. 
To understand why many buyers do not attach a price announcement or announce high 
prices when they pick flexible contracts, it is useful to compare outcomes of different types of 
contracts. Table A1 provides summary statistics for rigid contracts, flexible contracts without 
informal agreements (NoPA), flexible contracts with low price announcements (LowPA), and 
flexible contracts with high price announcements (HighPA). A first insight from the table is 
that flexible contracts without price announcements and with low price announcements yield 
30 Regressing an indicator variable for sending a price announcement on period yields a small, but significantly 
negative coefficient (coefficient = -0.007, p-value = 0.044, OLS estimation, standard errors clustered at the 
matching group level). 
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very similar outcomes. Neither price levels (Good state: 44.6 (NoPA), 42.7 (LowPA) / Bad 
state: 97.2 (NoPA), 98.8 (LowPA)), nor shading rates (Good state: 0.11 (NoPA), 0.14 (LowPA) 
/ Bad state: 0.15 (NoPA), 0.08 (LowPA)), nor buyer profits (Good state: 91.2 (NoPA), 91.8 
(LowPA) / Bad state: 36.7 (NoPA), 37.9 (LowPA)) are significantly different in either state of 
the world.31 Thus, buyers who decide not to make a price announcement do not suffer from a 
disadvantage. However, the fact that outcomes of flexible contracts with no announcements and 
flexible contracts with low announcements do not differ does not imply that the possibility of 
making price announcements is without consequence. A comparison of flexible contracts 
without announcements in the IA (see Table A1) and the BL (see Table 2 in the main text of 
the paper) shows considerable differences in shading rates (Good state: 0.23 (BL) vs. 0.11 (IA) 
/ Bad state: 0.23 (BL) vs. 0.15). The difference is highly significant in the good state, but 
insignificant in the bad state.32 Flexible contracts without announcements lead to different 
results depending on whether informal agreements are feasible (IA) or not (BL). Columns (1) 
and (2) of Table A2 provide further support. We use data from flexible contracts in the BL and 
IA and regress an indicator variable for shading on indicator variables for the IA, the attachment 
of a low or a high price announcement, and the violation of an informal agreement.33 Colum 
(1) examines the good state, column (2) repeats the analysis for the bad state. The estimations 
confirm that flexible contracts without announcements exhibit a lower shading rate in the IA 
than in the BL (as in our previous tests the coefficient of “IA” is highly significant in the good 
state (-0.144, p < 0.001), but not significant in the bad state (-0.081, p = 0.214)) and that low 
price announcements do not yield lower shading rates than no price announcements (“LowPA” 
is never significant: 0.020, p = 0.577 (Good state), -0.054, p = 0.197 (Bad state)). It seems that 
sellers interpret a buyer’s choice not to attach a price announcement as a signal that the buyer 
does not plan to pay a high price. This interpretation is consistent with the finding that no price 
announcement leads to the same outcome as a low announcement and also provides an 
explanation for why sellers respond differently to the same flexible contract depending on 
whether price announcements are feasible or not. 
31 Signrank tests (IA, flexible contracts without price announcements vs. flexible contracts with low price 
announcements): Prices: p = 0.790 (good state), p = 0.722 (bad state) / Shading: p = 0.306 (good state), p = 0.417 
(bad state) / Buyer profits: p = 0.182 (good state), p = 0.756 (bad state). 
32 Ranksum tests (flexible contracts without price announcements, IA vs. BL): Shading: p < 0.001 (good state), p 
= 0.226 (bad state). 
33 A price announcement is categorized as low if the announced price is less than or equal to 40 in the good state 
and less than or equal to 100 in the bad state. A violation of an informal agreement is defined as an actual price 
choice which is strictly lower than the ex ante price announcement for the corresponding state. 
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Figure A1, Table A1 and Table A2 provide further insights on high price 
announcements. Figure A1 indicates that buyers who make high price announcements are more 
likely to pay high prices (Spearman’s Rho for the correlation between prices and price 
announcements is 0.359 in the good state and 0.436 in the bad state). Table A1 confirms that 
the average price level in flexible contracts with high price announcements is higher (52.5) than 
in flexible contracts with low (42.7) or no announcements (44.6). However, Figure A1 also 
shows that – despite this positive correlation between announced and actually paid prices – 
buyers who make high price announcements are more likely to violate their informal agreement 
with the seller (see the increasing trend in violations relative to the total number of price 
announcements in Figure A1). The regressions in Column (1) and (2) of Table A2 reveal that 
violations of agreements lead to a significant increase in the shading rate (the coefficient of “PA 
Violation” is significantly positive in the good state: 0.075, p = 0.024 and bad state: 0.261, p = 
0.027). So buyers who make high price announcements typically end up with one of two 
outcomes: either they stick to their agreement and pay a high price (in which case shading is 
unlikely, see the significantly positive effect of “Price increment” in Table A2) or they violate 
their informal agreement and accept an increase in the probability of shading. This explains 
why high price announcements are associated with low profits (see Table A1). 
If high price announcements typically yield outcomes which are rather unfavorable for 
buyers, why do we observe them so often? Most likely the explanation is a combination of two 
motives. First, there may be fair-minded buyers who simply prefer to pay a high price. This is 
consistent with the fact that we see that some buyers make high price announcements and then 
stick to the announcement. Second, in the post-experimental questionnaire some buyers also 
wrote that they made high price offers to make the contract more attractive for sellers. This 
motive is somewhat misguided, because contracts are attractive to sellers anyway and high price 
announcements which are later violated only increase the shading rate. 
Finally, Table A1 also reinforces our finding that the presence of the opportunity to 
make informal price announcements does not eliminate the trade-off between contractual 
rigidity and flexibility. When viewed from the buyer perspective rigid contracts clearly 
dominate all kinds of flexible contracts when costs are low. Prices (38.9) and the shading rate 
(0.04) are lowest, so that buyer profits are highest (Rigid: 99.5, NoPA: 91.2 LowPA: 91.9, 
HighPA: 82.3).34 In the bad state, in contrast, rigid contracts do not allow for trade (average 
34 Signrank tests (IA): Rigid vs. NoPA: p = 0.008 / Rigid vs. LowPA: p = 0.013 / Rigid vs. HighPA: p = 0.003. 
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buyer profit = outside option = 10) and therefore flexible contracts are always more profitable 
for buyers (NoPA: 36.7, LowPA: 37.9, HighPA: 32.4). However, the advantage of rigid 
contracts in the good state is large enough to offset the disadvantage in the bad state, i.e., overall 
(across both states) buyer profits in rigid contracts (81.8) are still slightly higher than buyer 
profits in any type of flexible contract (NoPA: 80.6 LowPA: 81.0, HighPA: 72.6).35 
A.2 Revision 
In section IV.B we emphasize that non-revised rigid contracts in the RE and rigid contracts in 
the BL yield similar outcomes. In both cases buyers get away with low prices and low shading 
rates in the good state. This implies that the presence of revision opportunities does not induce 
sellers to hope for outcomes outside the contract, i.e., contracts seem to remain reference points 
even in the presence of revision opportunities. 
In flexible contracts, however, the availability of revision affects outcomes 
considerably. Table 2 reveals that prices and shading rates in flexible contracts are lower in the 
RE than in the BL. The comparison in Table 2 is slightly biased, because for the good state the 
data of the RE also contain opportunistically revised contracts.36 If we compare only non-
revised flexible contracts in the RE and the BL the difference is even more pronounced. In the 
good state flexible contracts in the BL yield an average price of 48.7, a shading rate of 0.23, 
and average buyer profits of 82.1 (see Table 2). The corresponding values in the RE are 43.6, 
0.10, and 92.4. All these difference are highly significant.37 The effects in the bad state are less 
pronounced and insignificant, but go in the same direction (prices: 97.6 (BL) vs. 96.9 (RE)), 
shading rates: 0.23 (BL) vs. 0.17 (RE), and buyer profits: 33.2 (BL) vs. 36.3 (RE)). These 
findings suggest that the availability of revision affects sellers’ perception of outcomes in non-
revised flexible contracts. Sellers seem to be more willing to accept low prices in flexible 
contracts if they know that the buyer has the possibility of revising the contract. A possible 
explanation for this effect is that the presence of the revision possibility shifts the focus partly 
away from prices to the revision decision itself, i.e., there may be sellers who find all outcomes 
acceptable as long as the buyer does not revise the contract in opportunistic ways. 
  
35 Signrank tests (IA): Rigid vs. NoPA: p = 0.374 / Rigid vs. LowPA: p = 0.859 / Rigid vs. HighPA: p = 0.041. 
36 Opportunistic revisions occur in 6% of the flexible contracts in which the good state has been realized in the 
RE. 
37 Rank-sum tests (non-revised flexible contracts, RE vs. BL): Price: p = 0.007 / Shading: p = 0.001 / Buyer profit: 
p < 0.001. 
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Figure A1: Price Announcements and Actual Prices in the IA 
 
Notes: The figure is based on data from the IA. The labels of the horizontal axis categorize informal agreements. 
“No” indicates that the buyer has not made a price announcements. The numbers describe ranges of price 
announcements (e.g., “40” means 35-40, “50” means 41-50 etc., and “80+” means 71 or higher). The bars represent 
relative frequencies of price announcements in the corresponding range (left axis). Observations for which the 
actual price is smaller than the announced price (violation of informal agreements) are displayed in light gray. 
Averages of actual prices per range of price announcements are represented as dots (right axis). 
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Table A1: Prices, Shading, and Buyer Profits Across Contracts in the IA 
Contract
State Good Bad Good Bad Good Bad Good Bad
Average Price 38.8 - 44.6 97.2 42.7 98.8 52.5 99.0
Rel. Freq. of Shading 0.04 - 0.11 0.15 0.14 0.08 0.13 0.22
Av. Auction Outcome
Average Profit Buyer 99.5 10.0 91.2 36.7 91.9 37.9 82.3 32.4
Average Profit Seller 18.5 10.0 24.0 16.4 22.0 18.4 31.9 17.9
Number of Observations 393 97 436 105 147 37 326 79
Rigid
16.8
HighPALowPANoPA
Flexible
38.5 37.7 38.4
80.6 81.0 72.6
22.6 21.3 29.1
38.9
81.8
 
Notes: The table summarizes the outcomes for rigid contracts and different types of flexible contracts in the IA 
treatment. “NoPA” stands for “no price announcement”. “LowPA” represents contracts, in which the buyer 
announced low prices for both states (i.e., price ≤ 40 in the good state, and price ≤ 100 in the bad state). “HighPA” 
contains contracts, in which the buyer announced a high price for at least one state (i.e., price > 40 in the good 
state, or price > 100 in the bad state). “Average Price” is the average ex post price paid by buyers. “Rel. Freq. of 
Shading” measures the relative frequency of shading. “Av. Auction Outcome” stands for the average fixed price 
(rigid contracts) or average lower bound of the price range (flexible contracts) determined in the competitive 
auctions. “Average Profit Buyer (Seller)” are the average profits for the respective trading party. 
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Table A2: Effects of Price Announcements in the IA 
Dependent Variable Shading Shading
State Good Bad
(1) (2)
IA -0.144*** -0.081
(0.031) (0.063)
Price increment -0.005*** -0.010***
(0.001) (0.003)
LowPA 0.020 -0.054
(0.035) (0.041)
HighPA 0.020 -0.038
(0.018) (0.060)
PA Violation 0.075** 0.261**
(0.031) (0.110)
Constant 0.295*** 0.256***
(0.028) (0.052)
Observations 1711 426
Clusters (Matching groups) 23 23
R2 0.054 0.054  
Notes: The regression analysis uses data from flexible contracts in the BL 
and the IA. Column (1) reports the effects in the good state, Column (2) 
analyzes the bad state. “IA” is an indicator variable which is unity if the 
observation comes from the IA. “Price increment” is equal to the price 
minus 35 in Column (1) and equal to the price minus 95 in Column (2). 
“LowPA” stands for low price announcements (i.e., price announcements 
that do not exceed 40 in the good state and do not exceed 100 in the bad 
state). “HighPA” stands for high price announcements (i.e., price 
announcements over 40 in the good state and over 100 in the bad state). 
Both columns report coefficients of OLS estimations (linear probability 
model). Since observations within matching groups may be dependent all 
reported standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the matching group 
level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Online Appendix – Part B: Replication of Results with 2013 Data Only 
In this second part of the online appendix we replicate all figures and tables presented in the 
main text of the paper using only the data collected in 2013. 
 
 
 
Figure B2 (Baseline vs. Informal Agreements): Prices and Shading Rates 
 
Notes: The figure is based on data from the BL and IA. In the IA flexible contracts include contracts with and 
without price announcements. Bars represent relative shading frequencies (left axis). Lines display the average 
lower bound of the price range, and dots represent average actual prices (right axis). 
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Figure B3 (Baseline vs. Revision): Prices and Shading Rates 
 
Notes: The figure is based on data from the BL and RE. In the RE the data for the good state include non-revised 
and revised contracts, the data for the bad state include revised rigid contracts (non-revised rigid contracts do not 
allow for trade) and flexible contracts. Bars represent relative shading frequencies (left axis). Lines display the 
average lower bound of the price range, and dots represent average actual prices (right axis). 
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Figure B4 (Revision): Shading Behavior in Rigid and Flexible Contracts 
 
Notes: The figure is based on data from the RE. “NoR” stands for contracts that have not been revised. “AltR” 
represents cases of “altruistic” revisions, i.e., rigid contracts in which the buyer has increased the price although 
the good state has been realized. “OppR” contains contracts in which the buyer has initiated an opportunistic 
revision to lower the price below the fixed price in rigid contracts or below the lower bound of the price range in 
flexible contracts. “MuBR” stands for mutually beneficial revisions. These are rigid contracts in which the buyer 
has increased the price to make trade feasible after the bad state has been realized. The bars represent relative 
shading frequencies (left axis). The solid lines display the average fixed price in rigid contracts, dashed lines show 
average lower bounds in flexible contracts and dots represent average actual prices (right axis). 
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Table B2: Summary Statistics – All Treatments 
Contract
State Good Bad Good Bad Good Bad Good Bad Good Bad Good Bad
Message sent - - - - - - - - - -
Av. Price Announcem. - - - - - - 54.4 101.8 - - - -
Revised contracts - - - - - - - - 0.08 0.85 0.05 0.00
Average Price 40.6 - 46.2 96.8 37.7 - 46.1 98.4 38.0 97.9 45.4 98.1
Rel. Freq. of Shading 0.05 - 0.21 0.16 0.04 - 0.11 0.10 0.05 0.21 0.15 0.24
Av. Auction Outcomce
Average Profit Buyer 97.3 10.0 85.4 36.9 100.9 10.0 89.3 37.6 100.0 30.1 88.4 32.2
Average Profit Seller 20.3 10.0 25.2 16.0 17.5 10.0 25.6 17.9 17.7 15.9 24.6 16.9
Share of  Contracts
0.6
Rigid
Baseline (BL) Informal Agreement (IA)
FlexibleRigidFlexible
23.3 16.3 24.1
40.4
80.0
18.3
39.5 37.8 37.8
75.5 85.8 79.2 86.8 76.6
17.4 23.0
Revision (RE)
Rigid Flexible
37.7 39.0
0.47 0.530.45 0.55 0.33 0.67
 
Notes: The table summarizes the outcomes for rigid and flexible contracts in all treatments. If meaningful the data are provided for each state of the world separately, otherwise 
the data are reported for both states together (centered entries in the table). “Message sent” indicates the share of contracts in which buyers attached a price announcement to a 
flexible contract. “Av. Price Announcem.” is the average price announcement made in contracts that had a message attached. “Revised contracts” indicates the share of revised 
contracts. “Average Price” is the average ex post price paid by buyers. “Rel. Freq. of Shading” measures the relative frequency of shading. “Av. Auction Outcome” stands for 
the average fixed price (rigid contracts) or average lower bound of the price range (flexible contracts) determined in the competitive auctions. “Average Profit Buyer (Seller)” 
are the average profits for the respective trading party. “Share of Contracts” indicates the relative frequency with which contracts have been chosen. 
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Table B3: Shading Rates in the BL and the IA 
Dependent Variable Shading Shading Shading Shading
Treatment BL & IA BL & IA BL & IA BL & IA
State Good Good Bad Bad
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Flexible contract 0.158*** 0.203***
(0.0.023) (0.037)
IA -0.016 -0.027 -0.058 -0.066
(0.018) (0.021) (0.069) (0.089)
Flex. Contr. x IA -0.081*** -0.066
(0.025) (0.043)
Price increment 0.001 -0.017**
(0.002) (0.006)
Flex. contr. x Price inc. -0.004*
(0.002)
IA x Price inc. 0.005 0.010
(0.004) (0.008)
Flex. Contr. x IA x Price inc. -0.005
(0.004)
Constant 0.052*** 0.048** 0.158** 0.188**
(0.014) (0.018) (0.063) (0.074)
Observations 1281 1281 191 191
Clusters (Matching groups) 13 13 13 13
R2 0.046 0.061 0.008 0.032  
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) use data from rigid and flexible contracts in the BL and the IA in which the good 
state has been realized. Columns (3) and (4) use data from flexible contracts in the BL and the IA in which the 
bad state has been realized. “Flexible contract” is an indicator variable which is unity if the contract is of the 
flexible type and zero otherwise. “IA” is an indicator variable which is unity if the observation comes from the 
IA and zero otherwise. “Price increment” is equal to price minus 35 (good state) or price minus 95 (bad state). 
This implies that the constant measures the shading rate in rigid contracts in the BL at the competitive price 
level (35 or 95, respectively). All columns report coefficients of OLS estimations (linear probability model). 
Since observations within matching groups may be dependent all reported standard errors are adjusted for 
clustering at the matching group level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table B4: Shading in Non-Revised and Revised Contracts in the RE 
Dependent Variable Shading Shading Shading Shading
Treatment BL & RE RE RE RE
State Good Bad Good Good
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RE 0.003
(0.026)
Price increment 0.001 -0.018 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.010) (0.002) (0.002)
RE x Price inc. -0.001
(0.003)
MB Revision -0.022
(0.083)
MB Rev. x Price inc. -0.004
(0.013)
Flexible Contract 0.089**
(0.024)
OPP Revision 0.562**
(0.217)
Flex contr. x OPP Rev. 0.063
(0.243)
ALT Revision 0.038
(0.069)
Constant 0.048** 0.300** 0.041** 0.040**
(0.018) (0.086) (0.014) (0.015)
Observations 584 130 525 255
Clusters (Matching groups) 13 6 6 6
R2 0.000 0.055 0.187 0.002
 
Notes: Column (1) uses data from non-revised rigid contracts in the BL and the RE in which the good state has 
been realized. Column (2) uses data from revised rigid contracts and flexible contracts in the RE in which the 
bad state of the world has been realized. Columns (3) and (4) use data from rigid contracts in the RE in which 
the good state has been realized. In column (3) observations with altruistic revisions are excluded. In column 
(4) observations with opportunistic revisions are excluded. “RE” is an indicator variable which is unity if the 
observation comes from the RE. “Price increment” is equal to price minus 35 (good state) or price minus 95 
(bad state). “MB Revision” is an indicator variable which is unity if a rigid contract has been revised after the 
bad state of the world has been realized (mutually beneficial revision). “Flexible contract” is an indicator 
variable which is unity if the contract is of the flexible type and zero otherwise. “OPP Revision” is an indicator 
variable which is unity if a rigid or a flexible contract has been revised in the good state of the world and the 
buyer lowered the price to a level below the auction outcome (opportunistic revision). “ALT Revision” is an 
indicator variable which is unity if a contract has been revised in the good state of the world and the buyer 
increased the price to a level above the auction outcome (altruistic revision). All columns report coefficients of 
OLS estimations (linear probability model). Since observations within matching groups may be dependent all 
reported standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the matching group level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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